The two Taiwan Strait crises took place during a particularly tense period of the Cold War. Although each incident was relatively brief, their consequences loom large. Based on analyses of newly available documents from Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, Pang Yang Huei challenges conventional wisdom that claims Sino-US misperceptions of each other’s strategic concerns were critical in the 1950s. He underscores the fact that Washington, Taipei, and Beijing were actually aware of one another’s strategic intentions during the crises. He also demonstrates conclusively that both “crises” can be understood as a transformation from tacit communication to tacit accommodation.
作者簡介
作者簡介
Pang Yang Huei is a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at the Singapore University of Technology and Design. Previously, he was an editor of a military journal at the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College. At the moment, he is working on his second and third books. One examines the role of the People’s Republic of China at the denouement of the Vietnam War. The other covers East Asia nuclear weapons and energy development.
Pang Yang Huei is a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at the Singapore University of Technology and Design. Previously, he was an editor of a military journal at the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College. At the moment, he is working on his second and third books. One examines the role of the People’s Republic of China at the denouement of the Vietnam War. The other covers East Asia nuclear weapons and energy development.
章節
- List of Illustrations
- Acknowledgments
- Guide to Transliteration
- List of Abbreviations
- Chronology
- 1. Introduction
- 2. A Stillness at Taiwan Strait
- 3. The Geneva Road
- 4. Outbreak of the Crisis
- 5. From Yijiangshan to Bandung
- 6. Sustaining Linkages
- 7. Roiling in Troubled Waters
- 8. The Warsaw Gambit
- 9. Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
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